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I. INTRODUCTION
n the history of the death penalty in the United States, the Supreme
Court has never held that a person has a constitutional right not to be
executed while insane, yet the non-execution of the insane has always
been a common law rule in the United States.
In Ford v. Wainwright,1 the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of an insane
inmate. In answering this query, the Court created a constitutional right
not to be executed while incompetent. However, the Ford decision is not
only important for its creation of a "new" constitutional right, it also has
the potential of nullifying several state statutes in regards to the due
process requirements of hearings addressing the issue of insanity at the
time of execution.2
The Ford decision also requires that a new test of sanity be created-
the test of whether one is competent enough to suffer death.3 This test
106 S.Ct. 2595 (1986).
2 See infra note 68.
3 There are thirty-six states that currently have standards of competency for execution.
The following survey was cited in Ward, Competency For Execution: Problems in Law and
Psychiatry, 14 FLA. ST. L. Pzv. 35 (1986). The year next to the state name indicates the year
the statute was enacted or the case decided.
Seventeen States which have instituted, by statute, the term "insane" as their applicable
standard: Alabama (1982), Arizona (1978), Arkansas (1977), California (1982), Connecticut
(1983), Georgia (1982), Kansas (1981), Maryland (1982), Massachusetts (1985), Mississippi
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will join other sanity tests employed in criminal law, for instance, the test
of whether one was sane at the time of the crime, 4 and the test for sanity
at the time of trial.6 The test for sanity in order to be executed, according
to Ford, will be a less rigid standard than the previously mentioned two.6
The Ford ruling on insanity goes to the core of the death penalty's
justification, and will also act in the long term to restrict the exercise of
capital punishment by the states. This new standard will require addi-
tional state statutes to efficiently comply with the Ford decision. The
purpose of this work is to propose the type of pre-hearing procedure
necessary to determine whether the insanity claim has merit, the test
needed to declare one sane enough to suffer death, and the type of statute
needed to constitutionally carry out the test by the use of a hearing.
I. HISORY OF INSANITY AND EXECUTION
"It is the rule in all jurisdictions that a sentence of execution cannot be
carried out if the prisoner is insane at the time set for the execution."7 A
(1985), Nebraska (1979), Nevada (1983), New Mexico (1984), New York (1984), Ohio (1982),
Oklahoma (1958), and Wyoming (1985).
Four states which have recently repealed their statutes indicating a standard for
competency and now rely on cases to employ the "insane" test: Colorado (1916), Kentucky
(1923), New Jersey (1908), and Texas (1924).
Five states which, by judicial adoption, use the term "insane" as a standard for
competency: Louisiana (1943), Tennessee (1911), Washington (1940), Rhode Island (1984),
and Virginia (1983).
Delaware (1979), Indiana (1981), North Carolina (1983), and South Carolina (1985) all
define, by statute, incompetency as "mentally active."
The six remaining states have a variety of standards. Florida in 1985 enacted a statute
which set the test as "whether (the convict] understands the nature and effect of the death
penalty and why it is to be imposed on him." See infra note 26 for the full text of this statute.
Illinois (1982) uses a statutory test that states: "Because of a mental condition he is
unable to understand the nature and purpose of [the death] sentence." "As a result of mental
disease... [the convict] lacks capacity to understand the nature and purpose about to be
imposed on him" is the statutory test passed in Missouri (1986). Montana's statute (1985)
merely asks whether the inmate "lacks mental fitness."
In Utah (1979), the statutory test is whether the convict is "suffering from a mental
disease or defect resulting either: (1) an inability to comprehend the nature of the
proceedings against him or (2) inability to assist counsel in his defense." Pennsylvania's
standard for competency comes from case law (1955), which holds "the controlling factor is
the degree or extent to which the mind is affected by the mental disorder and not bare
existence of symptoms which would induce a psychiatrist to diagnose mental illness."
4 See infra note 86.
s See infra note 92.
6 Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2610 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell's opinion was central
to the disposition of the Ford case because his vote made the 5-4 decision possible.
7 LAFAvE AND Scorr, Cm mAL LAw 340 (2d ed. 1986)(hereinafter cited as LAFA v). See,
(Vol. 35:515
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variety of reasons have been given for this rule. The traditional expla-
nation in old English common law was that "if the defendant were sane
he might be in a position to urge some reason why the sentence should not
be carried out."s Today this rationale has been replaced with a test for
sanity at the time of trial 9
Another reason for non-execution of the insane is that "madness is its
own punishment,"10 but this rationale no longer stands in light of the
retributive goal of the death penalty. n ' "Yet another reason is that it is a
rule of humanity-a refusal to take the life of an unfortunate prisoner.1 2
Justice Traynor, formerly of the California Supreme Court, supported
this rationale, and has defended it in an opinion.' 3
A theological rationale may have more support than any of the above
reasons, and although it has ancient roots, it is still valid.14 This
explanation holds that "a person should not be put to death while insane
because he is unable to make his peace with God while in that condi-
tion."16
e.g., Note, Insanity of the Condemned, 88 YALE L.J. 533 (1979); Hazard & Louisell, Death, the
State, and the Insane; Stay of Execution, 9 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 361 (1962).8 4 BLAcKKOsco , ComiENrARms 395-96 (13th ed. 1800), cited in LAFAVE, supra note 7, at
340.
9 See infra note 92.
10 Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2600 (citing Blackstone).
11 See infra note 75.
12 E. CoKE, TmD INsrru 7 (1797), cited in LAFAvE, supra note 7, at 340.
"3 Justice Traynor, concurring in Phyle v. Duffy, 34 Cal.2d 144, 208 P.2d 668 (1949),
stated: 'Is it not inverted humanitarianism that deplores as barbarious the capital
punishment of those who have become insane after trial and conviction, but accepts the
capital punishment for sane men, a curious reasoning that would free a man from capital
punishment only if he took leave of his senses? Id., 34 Cal.2d at 153, 208 P.2d at 676-677.
The Phyle case is important because it illustrates a situation that Justice Marshall was
concerned with and which may frequently arise in light of the Ford decision-frivolous
claims of insanity to forestall execution.
Phyle was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. While awaiting execution, the
warden pursuant to a California statute, notified the County court that imposed the
sentence that there was "good reason to believe Phyle was insane." 208 P.2d at 699. After
a jury trial on the issue of his competency, Phyle was committed to a mental institution. He
was subsequently restored to sanity and was then given a date for execution.
A few days before his execution, Phyle's mother filed a petition to reconsider his sanity.
Phyle argued that since a jury previously declared him insane, ajury must review his sanity
again. The California Supreme Court dismissed the petition as frivolous.
The Phyle case also demonstrates that no matter how baseless, once the question of sanity
has been raised by a condemned inmate, considerable judicial resources are used to resolve
the issue. For instance, in Phyle a state supreme court decision was needed. This waste of
judicial time can be avoided by having adequate procedures to dismiss frivolous claims of
insanity by death row prisoners. See p. 16.
"4 The Ford opinion cites this rationale. See Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2601
(1986).
"s Hawles, Remarks on the Trial of Mr. Charles Bateman, 11 STATE TeAts 474 (Howell
Ed. 1816). Cited in Ford, 106 S.Ct. at 2601 and LAFAVE, supra note 7, at 340.
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The most persuasive explanation for not executing incompetent in-
mates is that it is "simply... unnecessary to put the insane prisoner to
death."'1 The main argument for this position is that the death penalty is
based upon retribution, and an insane person's life is not "worth" as much
as his sane victim's.17
III. FACTS OF THE FORD CASE
On July 21, 1974, Alvin B. Ford murdered a wounded police officer by
shooting him in the back of the head at close range.18 Ford was tried and
sentenced to death. There was no suggestion, at any time, that Ford was
incompetent at the time of the murder, trial, or sentencing.19
In early 1982, Ford began to manifest gradual changes in behavior.
They began as an occasional peculiar idea or confused perception, but
became more serious over time.20 After reading a newspaper article on
the Ku Klux Klan, Ford became obsessed with the Klan and told long
stories of his Klan work. Ford also had at the time an increasingly
pervasive delusion that he had become the target of a complex conspiracy
involving the Klan and assorted others, designed to force him to commit
suicide.2
Ford also began an extensive hostage delusion involving members of
his family and members of the Senate. Ford ended the hostage crisis by
firing a number of prison officials. He then began to refer to himself as
"Pope John Paul HI" and reported having appointed nine new justices to
the Florida Supreme Court.22
Ford's counsel asked a psychiatrist, Dr. Amin, who examined Ford
previously, to examine him again and to recommend appropriate treat-
ment. After fourteen months of evaluation, Dr. Amin concluded in 1983
that Ford suffered from a severe, uncontrollable, mental disease which
closely resembles Paranoid Schizophrenia with Suicide Potential-a
major mental disorder.2
Ford refused to see Dr. Amin further, believing he was part of the
conspiracy against him, so other doctors were brought in. During one
session Ford stated: "I know there is some sort of death penalty, but I'm
free to go whenever I want it would be illegal and the executioner would
16 See, e.g., Hazard & Louisell, supra note 7.
17 See infra note 75.
"s Ford v. Wainwright, 752 F.2d 526, 527 (8th Cir. 1985). See infra note 38 for a
discussion of the Eighth Circuit's opinion.
's Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2598 (1986).
20 Id.
21 Id. at 2599.
22 Id.
23 Id.
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be executed." 24 When Ford was asked if he would be executed, Ford
replied, "I can't be because of the landmark case I won. Ford v. State will
prevent executions all over." 25 These statements were made rapidly
during long streams of babbling and seemingly unrelated thoughts.
A few months later, Ford had regressed until he became completely
incomprehensible, speaking only in codes and numbers. Counsel for Ford
invoked the procedures under a Florida statute which governs the
determination of competency of a condemned inmate.26 Following the
procedures of the statute, the Governor of Florida appointed a panel of
three psychiatrists to evaluate whether, under the statute, Ford had the
"mental capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and the
reasons why it was imposed upon him."27
Following a thirty minute meeting with Ford, the three pyschiatrists
each filed a short report to the governor. The psychiatrists, although
having three different diagnoses, all found Ford capable of understanding
24 Id.
1 Id. It is interesting to note that this conversation took place three years prior to this
appeal.
26 The following is the Florida statute which was held unconstitutional in Ford. Fla.
Stat. § 922.07 (1985) states:
"(1) When the Governor is informed that a person under sentence of death may
be insane, he shall stay execution of the sentence and appoint a commission of
three psychiatrists to examine the convicted person. The Governor shall notify the
psychiatrists in writing that they are to examine the convicted person to
determine whether he understands the nature and effect of the death penalty and
why it is to be imposed upon him. The examination of the convicted person shall
take place with all three psychiatrists present at the same time. Counsel for the
convicted person and the state attorney may be present at the examination. If the
convicted person does not have counsel, the court that imposed the sentence shall
appoint counsel to represent him.
(2) After receiving the report of the commission, if the Governor decides that the
convicted person has the mental capacity to understand the nature of the death
penalty and the reasons why it was imposed upon him, he shall issue a warrant
to the warden directing him to execute the sentence at the time designated in the
warrant.
(3) If the Governor decides that the convicted person does not have the mental
capacity to understand the nature of the death penalty and why it was imposed on
him, he shall have him committed to a Department of Corrections mental health
treatment facility.
(4) When a person under sentence of death has been committed to a Department
of Corrections mental health facility, he shall be kept there until the facility
administrator determines that he has been restored to sanity. The facility
administrator shall notify the Governor of his determination, and the Governor
shall appoint another commission to proceed as provided in subsection (1).
(5) The Governor shall allow reasonable fees to psychiatrists appointed under
the provisions of this section which shall be paid by the state.
27 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2599.
1987]
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1987
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
the implications of the death penalty and therefore sane enough to suffer
death.28
The Governor, without statement or explanation, announced that he
had signed Ford's death warrant for execution.29 Ford's counsel unsuc-
cessfully tried to get a state court hearing to determine Ford's sanity and
competency to be executed. Ford's counsel filed a petition for habeas
corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
Florida, seeking an evidentiary hearing on the question of Ford's san-
ity.3o The District Court denied the writ, and the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals addressed the merits of Ford's claim and a divided panel
affirmed the District Court's denial of the writ.31 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
IV. THE FORD OPnION
The Supreme Court in Ford reversed the Eleventh Circuit decision on
both substantive and procedural grounds. The majority was comprised of
Justices Brennan, Stevens, and Blackmun, with Justice Marshall writing
for the Court. Justice Marshall began by saying that "since the last time
the Court was presented with an issue involving the infliction of the
death penalty on the insane, interpretations of the Eight Amendment
and the Due Process Clause had changed substantially."32 The last time
the Court was presented with an issue similar to that in Ford was in
Solesbee v. Balkom,33 a 1950 case. Justice Marshall further stated "Injow
28 Id. One doctor believed that Ford's disorder, "although severe, seemed contrived and
recently learned." Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Id. See infra note 38 for a discussion of the Eighth Circuit decision.
32 Id.
33 339 U.S. 9 (1950). In Solesbee, an inmate, awaiting execution, claimed that he had
become insane after conviction and sentence; on that ground he requested the Governor of
Georgia to stay the execution. The Governor followed a Georgia statute, similar to the
Florida statute overturned in Ford, and appointed three physicians who declared Solesbee
sane.
Justice Black wrote the opinion for the seven member majority and held that:
The postponement of execution because of insanity bears a close affinity not to
trial for a crime but rather the reprieves of sentence in general. The power to
reprieve has usually sprung from the same source as the power to pardon... Such
power has traditionally rested in governors or the President, although some of
that power is often delegated to agencies such as pardon or parole boards. Seldom,
if ever, has this power of executive clemency been subjected to review by the
courts.
Id. at 11.
Since Justice Douglas did not take part in the consideration of the decision, Justice
Frankfurter was the sole dissenter. In his dissent Frankfurter stated that executing an
[Vol. 35:515
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that the Eighth Amendment has been recognized to affect significantly
both the procedural and substantive aspects of the death penalty, the
question of executing the insane takes on a wholly different complex-
ion."3
4
The Court begins its inquiry by looking at the common law of England
from the seventh century. From its examination of the old common law
the Court concludes, for various reasons, that the.common law has always
forbidden the execution of the insane.35
Justice Marshall then turns to American common law and says that
"this solid proscription was carried to America, where it was early
observed that the 'judge is bound to stay the execution upon insanity of
the prisoner."' 36
Looking at modern state statutes, the Court observed that, "[tioday, no
State in the union permits the execution of the insane."37 The Court went
on to summarize its Eighth Amendment rationale:
It is clear that the ancient and humane limitation upon the
State's ability to execute its sentences has as firm a hold upon
the jurisprudence of today as it had centuries ago in England.
The various reasons put forth in support of the common law
restrictions have no less logical, moral, and practical force than
when first voiced. For today, no less than before, we may
seriously question the retributive value of executing a person
insane person violates the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In support of
this contention Frankfurter stated:
If the deeply rooted principle in our society against killing an insane man is to
be respected, at least the minimum provision for assuring a fair application of that
principle is inherent in the principle itself. And the minimum assurance that the
life-and-death guess will be a truly informed guess requires respect for the basic
ingredient of due process, namely, an opportunity to be allowed to substantiate a
claim.
Id. at 23.
34 Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2600.
35 Justice Marshall quotes from 4 BLAcKsroNE CouhixrrARmEs. See supra note 8:
If, after he [a prisoner] be tried and found guilty, he loses his senses before
judgment, judgment shall not be pronounced; and if, after judgment, he becomes
of nonsane memory, execution shall be stayed: for preadventure, says the
humanity of the English law, had the prisoner been of sound memory, he might
have alleged something in stay ofjudgment or execution.
106 S. Ct. at 2601.
36 Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2601. Here Justice Marshall quotes from 1 J. CHrry, A PRAcmcAL
TEATrisE ON Tm CRmnNAL LAW, 761 (5th Amer. Ed. 1847).
37 Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2602. This statement was footnoted in the Ford opinion as footnote
#2, which notes: "Of the 50 states, 41 have a death penalty or statutes governing execution
procedures. Of those, 26 have statutes explicitly requiring the suspension of the execution
of a prisoner who meets the legal test for incompetence." Id. For a discussion of those
statutes fitting the Court's latter description, see infra note 68.
1987]
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who has no comprehension of why he has been singled out and
stripped of his fundamental right to life. Similarly, the natural
abhorence civilized societies feel at killing one who has no
capacity to come to grips with his own conscience or deity is still
valid today.38
The Court then addresses the issue of whether the District Court was
bound by law to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the question of
Ford's sanity. The Majority cites Townsend v. Sain,39 in which the Court
held that, "[i]n a habeas corpus proceeding, 'a federal evidentiary
hearing is required unless the state-court trier of fact has after a full
hearing reliably found the relevant facts."' 40 The Court also discusses 28
U.S.C. section 2254, which was enacted shortly after the Townsend
decision, and finds that even if the state court has rendered judgment,
the federal court is obligated to hold an evidentiary hearing in a habeas
corpus action if the state procedure was lacking in one of several areas.4 '
Justice Marshall further states that under the Townsend decision the
adequacy of a state court procedure is determined by the circumstances
and the interests at stake, and in a capital punishment case, the Court
requires that "factfinding procedures aspire to a heightened standard of
reliability. '4 2
The Majority found that the Florida statute governing the execution of
inmates alleged to be incompetent43 fails on three procedural grounds.
" Ford v. Wainwright, 752 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1985). The Eighth Circuit stated that
although Ford's argument that an insane person could not be executed had merit, "no
federal appellate court has so held." 752 F.2d at 527. The court affirmed the District Court's
denial of Ford's petition because it was bound by Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950). For
a discussion of Solesbee, see infra note 33.
Judge Clark wrote a strong dissent saying that the two part analysis of the Eighth
Amendment, whether the practice offends contemporary standards of decency and whether
the practice comports with the dignity of man, clearly forbids the execution of an insane
person. Clark also noted that: "It has been a part of the English common law since the
medieval period that the presently incompetent should not be executed." 752 F.2d at 530.
39 372 U.S. 293 (1963). In Townsend, the defendant objected at his murder trial to the
admission of his confession made under the influence of a "truth serum" and therefore
coerced. The evidence was admitted and he was convicted. After several state appeals
without any hearings on the issue, Townsend filed a federal habeas corpus petition. See, e.g.,
Note, Mandatory Hearings in Federal Habeas Corpus Proceedings, 11 Loy. L. REv. 297
(1963); Note, The 1963 Trilogy, 42 N.C.L. Rev. (1964).
40 Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2603 (1986). See e.g., Batey, Federal Habeas
Corpus Relief and the Death Penalty: "Finality with a Capital F", 36 U. FLA. L. RFv. 252
(1984).
41 28 U.S.C. § 2254 codifies procedures to be used in Federal habeas corpus actions.
Since this statute is a minor part of the Ford decision, its discussion has been omitted.
42 Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2603.
41 Id. In Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984), the Court held that there is no
constitutional requirement that a jury's recommendation of life imprisonment in a capital
case be final so as to preclude the trial judge from overriding the jury's recommendation and
imposing the death sentence.
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The first deficiency the Court cites is that the statute denies the
condemned inmate the fundamental right to be heard, for the statute
lacks any procedure for the prisoner to present evidence of his incompe-
tency. The Court further stated:
[C]onsistent with the heightened concern for fairness and accu-
racy that has characterized our review of the process requisite to
the taking of a human life, we believe that any procedure that
precludes the prisoner or his counsel from presenting material
relevant to his sanity or bars consideration of that material by
the factfinder is necessarily inadequate. 44
The second flaw the Court finds in the statute is that it does not
provide for any opportunity for cross-examination or impeachment of the
three state-appointed psychiatrists. The majority notes that the process
of cross-examination is of vital importance and "would contribute
markedly to the process of seeking truth in sanity disputes by bringing
to light the bases of each expert's testimony, . . . [and] any history of
error or caprice of the examiner. . . ."45 Thus, the Court rejected the
statute for its total ignorance of any procedure that would facilitate
the challenging of the state expert's methods or opinions.46
The third, and as Justice Marshall notes, most "striking defect in the
procedures under the Florida statute is the State's placement of
the decision wholly within the executive branch."47 Under the statute,
the Governor appoints the experts who examine the inmate and he alone
makes the ultimate decision of whether to carry out the sentence. A
Governor who is charged with the execution of the laws of the state, and
is the commander of the prosecutors cannot be said to have the neutrality
that is necessary for reliability in the fact-finding proceeding. 48
The majority concludes by saying that they have, in this decision,
" Ford, 106 S. Ct at 2604.
41 Id. at 2605.
"Id. In Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983), the Court stated:
Psychiatric testimony need not be based on personal examination of the
defendant but may properly be given in response to hypothetical questions.
Expert testimony, whether in the form of an opinion based on hypothetical
questions or otherwise, is commonly admitted as evidence where it might help the
factfinder do its job.
463 U.S. at 902.
See also, Comment, Barefoot v. Estelle: Psychiatric Predictions Used as Evidence in
Determining WhetherDeath is anAppropriatePunishment, 9 OKLA. L. REV. 197 (1984); Note,
Psychiatric Testimony and the Issue of Future Dangerousness, 20 Hous. L. REV. 1179
(1983). Comment, Legal and Psychiatric Concepts and the Use of Psychiatric Evidence in
Criminal Trials, 73 CALuF. L. Rsv. 411 (1984).
47 Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2605 (1986).
49 Id.
1987]
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recognized a principle that has long resided in our law, and is no less
abhorrent today than it was for centuries--to execute a person who does
not comprehend the reasons for his punishment is wrong.49
In reviewing the procedural aspect of the decision, Justice Marshall
notes:
We do not here suggest that only a full trial on the issue of
insanity will suffice to protect the federal interests; we leave to
the State the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the
constitutional restrictions upon its execution of sentences. It may
be that some high threshold showing on behalf of the prisoner
will be found a necessary means to control the number of
nonmeritorious or repetitive claims of insanity.5 0
Justice Powell wrote a long concurring opinion on the issue of whether
execution of an insane inmate violates the cruel and unusual punishment
clause of the Eighth Amendment, and concurred in the judgment. Justice
Powell pointed out that the Court's conclusion leaves two questions to be
determined: "(1) the meaning of insanity in this context, and (2) the
procedures States must follow in order to avoid the necessity of de novo
review in federal courts under 28 U.S.C. section 2254(d)."5' The Court's
opinion does not address the first of these questions, and Justice Powell
disagrees with Justice Marshall concerning the resolution of the second.
Justice Powell then dispels the old argument that the prohibition
against executing the insane was justified as a way of preserving the
defendant's ability to make arguments on his own behalf. He accomplishes
this by pointing out the long appeals process to which defendants are
entitled and that defendants have the right to effective assistance of
counsel.6 2
At common law, executions of the insane are simply cruel and unusual,
thus justifying the extension of the Eighth Amendment's protection to
the insane. Justice Powell's primary reason for concurring with Justice
Marshall on the Eighth Amendment issue is that the major justification
of capital punishment is retribution, and the force of the retribution relies
upon the defendant's awareness of the penalty's existence and purpose.5 3
If the defendant perceives the connection between his crime and his
punishment, Powell says, the retributive goal of the criminal law is
satisfied.5 4 As a result of this belief, Powell would restrict the Eighth
"g Id. at 2606.
50 Id.
" Id. at 2595, 2606.
52 Id. at 2608.
53 Id. at 2609.
4 Id.
[Vol. 35:515
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Amendment's protection "only to those who are unaware of the punish-
ment they are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it." 5 5
Justice Powell then addresses the due process issue of the Florida
statute. The first point on which he differs with the majority is that the
only question raised by this case is when the inmate is to be executed
not whether he is to be executed. 56 This question is important, but not
so as to require the heightened procedural requirements ordered by the
majority.57
Secondly, Powell says, the inmate in this case has already been
convicted and sentenced, so he must have been judged competent to stand
trial, or his competency must have been sufficiently clear as not to raise
a serious question for the trial court.5 8 Powell also notes that, "The state
therefore may properly presume that petitioner remains sane at the time
sentence is to be carried out, and may require a substantial threshold
showing of insanity merely to trigger the hearing process."5 9 Lastly,
Powell states that cross-examination and other aspects of the adversarial
process are not needed because the question of sanity is subjective.
Justice O'Connor and Justice White dissent by finding that the Eighth
Amendment does not create a substantive right not to be executed while
insane and concur with the majority opinion by concluding that the
Florida statute did not provide for even minimal procedural protections. 60
Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger dissented, attacking the
Court's decision by saying that it is based almost entirely on two
observations; one, that there is "virtually no authority condoning the
execution of the insane at English common law,"61 and "no state in the
union permits the execution of the insane."632 The dissenters continue:
Armed with these facts, and shielded by the claim that it is
simply "keeping faith with our common law heritage," the Court
proceeds to cast aside settled precedent and to significantly alter
both the common-law and the current practice of not executing
the insane. It manages this feat by carefully ignoring the fact
that the Florida scheme it finds unconstitutional, in which the
55 Id.
11 Id. at 2595, 2610. (Emphasis added.) In Justice Powell's footnote 5, Id., he states: 'It
is of course true that some defendants may lose their mental faculties and never regain
them, and thus avoid execution altogether. My point is only that if petitioner is cured of his
disease, the state is free to execute him."
57 Id.
8 Id. at 2611.
r9 Id.
w Id. at 2611, 2612. Justices O'Connor and White note that: "(l]t is self evident that once
society has validly convicted an individual of a crime and therefore established its right to
punish, the demands of due process are reduced accordingly."
61 Id. at 2595, 2613.
62 Id.
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Governor is assigned the ultimate responsibility of deciding
whether a condemned prisoner is insane, is fully consistent with
the 'common-law heritage' and current practice on which the
Court proports to rely.6 3
Aside from perceiving Solesbee v. Balkcom64 to be binding precedent on
the Court, the dissent also uses it to stand for the proposition that the
postponement of an execution is not a trial for a crime, so there is no need
for restrictive due process considerations. The dissenters also use the
Solesbee decision to dispel the argument that a determination of sanity
cannot take place solely within the Executive branch.
In summary, the dissent concludes:
Since no state sanctions execution of the insane, the real battle
being fought in this case is over what must accompany the
inquiry into sanity. I find it unnecessary to'constitutionalize' the
already uniform view that the insane should not be executed, and
inappropriate to 'selectively incorporate' the common law prac-
tice.65
V. IwLICATIONS oF riE DECISION
Through the end of 1983, actual execution has been the least common
cause of death for those persons sentenced to die under the current
generation of capital punishment statutes.66 Furthermore, it is a fact that
condemned prisoners more commonly die from natural causes, being
killed by fellow inmates, or suicide, than die by lawful execution.67
The Ford decision will immediately affect a states' ability to execute
death row inmates. Several states have statutes dealing with the deter-
mination of competency to be executed; however, many of these statutes
may not comport with Ford's due process requirement for sanity hear-
ings.6 8 Those states whose statutes need revision must change their
a
8 ld.
6 For a discussion of the Solesbee decision see supra note 33.
Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2615. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
66 NAACP LEGAL DEFENS5 AND EDUCATION FUND, INc., DEATH Row, U.S.A. 1, (Dec. 20,
1983), cited in Streib, Executions Under the Post-Furman Capital Punishment Statutes: The
Halting Progression from 'Let's Do It" to 'Hey, There Ain't No Point In Pulling So Tight,"
15 RuTGEss L.J. 443 (1984). Streib defines the current generation of capital punishment
statutes as those statutes adopted following Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See
infra note 71 for a discussion of the Furman case.
r7 See Streib, supra note 66. In Streib's footnotes 2 and 3 he states: "From 1973 until
1983, fifteen prisoners on death row died of natural causes or were killed" and "[firom 1973
until 1983, thirteen prisoners on death row committed suicide."
1s In its second footnote the Court points out that "26 [states] explicitly requiring the
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existing procedures and create a new method of finding an inmate fit to
suffer death. The Ford Court stated that it would "leave to the State[s]
suspension of the execution of prisoner who meets the legal test for incompetence." 106 S.
Ct. at 2602. The following is a summary of these states' statutory procedures for the
determination of competency. The Ohio and Florida statutes are omitted because of their
treatment elsewhere in this work. See infra note 131 and supra note 26, and their
accompanying text, respectively. The statutes are grouped according to their constitution-
ality in light of the Ford decision.
Statutes that are unconstitutional: Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. § 43-26-22 (1977). An
inmate who is thought to be insane is confined to a state hospital for 30 days, after such time
a written report is made to the Governor, who has the power to grant a stay of execution or
proceed with the execution; Georgia, GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-61 (1982). The Georgia statute
is identical to the Florida statute overturned in Ford. See supra note 26; Illinois, ILL. REv.
STAT. ch. 1005 § 2-5 (1982). If a death row inmate's sanity is questioned, a clinical
psychologist shall be appointed and form an opinion of fitness in regard to the convict. No
procedures are available for the defendant to present evidence or for judicial involvement;
Maryland, MI. Arm. Cos Art 27 § 75(C). After a medical examination, a report concerning
the inmate's prognosis is issued to the Governor, who has sole discretion to order the
convict's removal into a state mental hospital.
Statutes whose constitutionality is now questionable: New York, N.Y. CoRnaEr. LAw § 655
(McKinney Supp. 1987). If a condemned prisoner "appears to be insane," the Governor may
appoint three disinterested persons to examine him. The defendant may take part in the
proceedings and then a report is submitted to the Governor, who makes the final decision
on the convict's sanity; South Dakota, S.D. CODIED LAWs ANN. § 23A-27A-22 (1979). If a
convict sentenced to death "appears to be mentally incompetent," the Governor appoints
from three to five disinterested physicians. This commission makes an examination of the
inmate, and then acts as the hearing judge where witnesses are produced. Afterward, the
commission gives the Governor a report of their findings.
Statutes which are constitutional: Colorado, COLO. REv. STAT. § 16-8-111 (1978). When an
inmate's competency is questioned, a hearing is set to determine the issue. At the hearing,
the burden of submitting evidence and the burden of proof by a preponderance of the
evidence are upon the party asserting the incompetency of the defendant; Connecticut,
CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 54-101 (1985). Upon an application to the court concerning the inmate's
sanity, three physicians are appointed to examine the defendant and then a hearing is held
with an opportunity for the defense to present evidence; Kansas, KAN. STAT. ANN. § 224006
(1981). Ifa convict "appears" insane, the district judge investigates and decides whether a
commission ought to be named to examine the convict. If the judge finds the convict sane,
he may proceed with the execution. If the judge finds grounds for the inmate's insanity, he
may suspend the execution and appoint the superintendents of the four state mental
hospitals, three of which must find the convict insane to postpone the execution; Missouri,
Mo. REv. STAT. § 552.050 (1987). If there is "reasonable cause to believe" that a condemned
inmate is incompetent, he is transferred to a mental hospital for a 90 day confinement and
if no noticeable improvement is made, he may be given a one year confinement at the
hospital; Nebraska, NEs. REv. STAT. § 29-2537 (1979). This statute is almost an exact
reproduction of KAN. STAT. ANN. Sec. 22-4006 above; Nevada, NEv. REv. STAT. 176. 425 -
1761435 (1977). If the warden has "good reason to believe" that an inmate is insane, and a
physician concurs in his judgment, a hearing is held. Two psychiatrists are appointed and
one is assigned to the defendant to help prepare his case. At the hearing the defendant is
permitted to present evidence and cross-examine witnesses; New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 30:4-82 (West 1981). Ifa condemned inmate appears to be insane he is given a full hearing
on the issue. This hearing will be "like an action for commitment" (in probate court]; New
Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-14-4 (1984). Once there is "good reason to believe" that an
inmate is insane, a hearing is had and the district attorney must produce witnesses to prove
1987]
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the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional
restriction upon its execution of sentences."69
The time state legislatures need to write and enact constitutional
procedures for the determination of sanity to suffer execution may be
substantial. Ohio, for example, needed nine years to create a constitu-
tional death penalty statute. Ohio's experience in enacting the proper
legislation can serve as a useful lesson in what may arise from the Ford
decision.
In Furman v. Georgia7° the Court held that the imposition and carrying
out of the death penalty, in cases in which persons convicted of capital
offenses could be sentenced to death at the discretion of the judge or jury,
constitutes cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments.71 Many observers saw Furman as restricting a
state's ability to exercise capital punishment.72
"The Ohio legislature, which had been in the process of revising Ohio's
death penalty law at the time Furman was decided, adopted a new death
his sanity; Montana, MoNT. CoDE Am. § 46-14-202 (1984). When a condemned inmate's
sanity is questioned, a psychiatrist is appointed to examine him, and if there is good reason
to believe he is insane, a hearing is held;North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-1002 (1983).
If the sanity of a condemned convict is questioned, the court appoints one or more impartial
medical experts to examine him, and then report to the court. If a finding of insanity is
made, a hearing on the issue is held; Utah, UTAH CoD ANN. § 77-19-13 -77-19-15 (1982). If
there is "good reason to believe that the defendant is insane," the court appoints two doctors
to examine him, who submit a report of their findings to the court. Afterward, a hearing is
held and if the defendant is found insane, he cannot apply for a reinstatement of sanity
hearing until six months later.
States with statutes whose constitutionality is unquestionable because they employ a full
jury trial to determine a convict's competency: Alabama, ALA. COoE § 15-16-27 (1982),
Arizona, ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4021 (1978), California, CAL. PEAL COD ANm. § 3701
(West 1982), Kentucky, Ky. REV. STAT. § 431-238(1) (1985), Mississippi, MISS. Cooe ANN.
§ 99-19-57 (Supp 1985), Oklahoma, OxLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 1005 (1986), and Wyoming, Wyo.
STAT. § 7-31-901 (Supp. 1985).
69 Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2606.
70 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
1 This holding comes from a short Per Curiam opinion, 408 U.S. at 239. Aside from this
Per Curiam opinion, each Justice wrote separately, with Justices Douglas, Brennan,
Stewart, White and Marshall in the majority and Chief Justice Burger, along with Justices
Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist dissenting.
From the opinions of the majority, a common theme of the randomness (Stewart),
selectiveness (Douglas), and infrequency (White) of the administration of the death penalty
arose. For these reasons the majority held that the way the death penalty was being
implemented violated the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment.
712 See, e.g., Note, Capital Punishment Statutes After Furman, 35 Oaio Sr. L. J. 651
(1974); Note, The Furman Case: What Life is Left in the Death Penalty?, 22 CATH. U. L. REV.
651 (1973); Comment, Furman u. Georgia: A Post-nortem on the Death Penalty, 18 Vni. L.
REv. 678 (1973).
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penalty statute in 1972."73 This new statute was thought to be in
accordance with the Supreme Court's construction of the requirements
needed to constitutionally execute a death row inmate.74 This statute
remained in place after the Gregg v. Georgia75 attack upon the death
penalty. Apparently this belief was not valid, for in Lockett v. Ohio76 the
Court struck down the 1972 statute because it "did not permit the type of
individualized consideration of mitigating factors [the Court] now hold[s]
to be required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments in capital
cases."77
Unlike the Lockett Court, the Ford Court was not explicit in its
command to the states regarding the procedures to be implemented to
carry out the death penalty. Aside from the section of the opinion dealing
with the Eighth Amendment, the Ford decision merely gave three
reasons why the Florida statute was procedurally unconstitutional and
stated: "We do not suggest that only a full trial on the issue of sanity will
suffice to protect the federal interests; we leave to the State the task of
developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction
upon its execution of sentences."78
If the states whose statutory procedure of determining sanity for
purposes of execution do not adequately change their laws, several years
of litigation to determine the constitutionality of their new laws will limit
the number of executions they will carry out.
Aside from the time that will be spent revising existing statutes
dealing with competency for execution, a large amount of time will be
spent litigating statutes to determine whether they violate the Ford
standard. The Ford decision explicitly enumerates a basis for appeal-the
process to determine the inmate's sanity lacks sufficient due process
considerations. Undoubtedly, many appeals will arise on this issue,
7' D. Benson, Constitutionality of Ohio's New Death Penalty Statute, 14 U. TOL. L. Rzv.
77, 79 (1982).
"" See supra note 73.
75 428 U.S. 153 (1976). In Gregg, the Court addressed the constitutionality of the death
penalty itself, and held that the punishment of death for the crime of murder does not, under
all circumstances, violate the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The majority also stated:
The death penalty is said to serve two principal social purposes: retribution and
deterrence of capital crimes by prospective offenders. .... In part, capital
punishment is an expression of society's moral outrage at particularly offensive
conduct. This function may be unappealing to many, but it is essential in an
ordered society that asks its citizens to rely on legal process rather than self-help
to vindicate their wrongs.
428 U.S. 183.
See also, Zeisel, The Deterrent Effect of theDeath Penalty: Facts v. Faith, 1976 S. CT. REV. 54.
76 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
77 1d. at 606.
78 Ford v. Wainwright, 105 S. Ct. 2595, 2606 (1986).
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further extending the time from judgment to execution of a capital
criminal.?9
VI. CHANGES THAT Ais NEEDED TO COMPLY WITH FoRD
An important consideration in changing or evaluating existing compe-
tency for execution laws is the threshold requirement of receiving any
hearing. If states create too strict a standard to establish a presumption
of incompetency and thus the need for a hearing, prisoners' due process
rights will be violated. However, if a state's threshold for a hearing to
determine sanity is too easily met, countless delays will be created by
every death row inmate pleading incompetency to forestall execution.
There are three areas of concern that must be addressed when creating
or changing procedures for the determination of sanity for execution. The
first area addressed is a threshold question as to what kind and degree of
evidence is needed to create a right to a hearing on sanity, who will decide
the threshold question and what methods will be used. If a prisoner is
judged sane at the time of the crime and trial, Justice Powell states, in his
concurring opinion: "The State may properly presume that [a) petitioner
remains sane at the time sentence is to be carried out, and may require
a substantial threshold showing of insanity merely to trigger the hearing
process."80
The second area that must be developed is a test for sanity for
execution. This test will be used at the hearing once the threshold
question is met. Unlike the tests for sanity at the time of the crime and
at trial, this test for sanity may be less stringent.8 1
The final area in need of development is the due process considerations
needed in the hearing process to determine the sanity of an inmate
awaiting execution. Although the Court in Ford points out that a full
evidentiary trial is not necessary, it strikes down the Florida statute
because it lacks the opportunity to be heard, a chance to cross-examine
the experts on whose opinions the finding of sanity turns, and the
opportunity for judicial involvement in the hearing process. A balance
must be struck between the type of due process requirements of Ford and
the minimum standards needed to remain constitutional.8 2
11 It is estimated that the average time from conviction to execution for those put to
death is over twelve years. See, e.g., Silas, The Death Penalty, 71 A.B.A. J. 48 (1985).
80 Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2611.
81 See supra note 56.
82 Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, 106 S. Ct. at 2611, comments: 'Ve need not
determine the precise limits that due process imposes in this area. In general, however, my
view is that a constitutionally acceptable procedure may be less formal than a trial." See
also, supra note 70.
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Once all three of these areas are discussed, the Ohio statutes concern-
ing the inquiry of sanity of the convict and the proceedings established to
determine sanity will be examined to determine what revisions need to be
made to bring the statutes within Ford's guidelines.
A. Preliminary Determination of Sanity
If every inmate were entitled to a due process hearing on the question
of his sanity before execution, each condemned prisoner would demand
such a hearing and an endless cycle of litigation would result, further
taxing judicial resources. Therefore, in the interest of judicial economy
and in order to narrow the number of possible hearings needed, a
threshold test of sufficient difficulty, yet reliability, must be devised.
Assuming accuracy is of the utmost concern, the immediate problem
that arises in creating such a hurdle is what type of procedure can be used
without itself becoming a full hearing. Ironically, the Florida statute
struck down in Ford provides an example of the procedure that would
best suit a preliminary finding of possible insanity. However, it is
important to note that the use of the statute here is not the same as its
role as the sole determinant of sanity of condemned prisoners in Florida.
Florida Statute section 922.07 provides for three psychiatrists to
examine the convicted person and to report to the Governor in writing
their diagnosis of his mental state.93 The statute did not permit counsel
for the convicted person to participate in the examination or present
evidence to the Governor.8 4
The proposed threshold hearing would also use a three psychiatrist
panel to interview and examine the inmate. These doctors would also
have to qualify as being disinterested so as to achieve absolute impar-
tiality. A strong belief, either for or against the use of capital punish-
ment, would disqualify a potential panel member. The appointing trial
judge would conduct this short test before impanelling each member.
Unlike the Florida statute, the doctors would each be given an
opportunity to examine the prisoner individually without the presence of
the other experts. It may also be useful to have a time in which the
psychiatrists may observe the inmate without his knowledge, for this
procedure would assist in discovering any convicted persons with disor-
ders "recently learned."8 5
Once the experts were satisfied that they had sufficient time to
examine the prisoner, they would make written findings to the judge of
the convicting court. Depending on the outcome of the diagnosis, the
inmate would either be given a hearing in which to prove his insanity, or
he would be given a date for execution.
I See supra note 26 for the full text of the statute.
84 Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2604.
" See supra note 28.
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Attorneys for the state and inmate would not participate in any of the
examinations or findings by the doctors. The prisoner's counsel would
initiate this preliminary determination procedure merely by petitioning
the court which convicted the inmate, which would be unable to dismiss
the application.
B. Test for Sanity at Time of Execution
Before discussing what a test of sanity for execution would consist of, it
is necessary to examine other tests of legal sanity, which are employed at
different times in the criminal process. Historically, competency at the
time the crime is committed is considered the most important measure-
ment of sanity, for if the accused was not sane at the time of his crime he
may not have had the required mens rea to be held accountable for it.86
A test to ascertain the accused's mental abilities at the time of trial has
also been developed to ensure that the prisoner can participate in his own
defense.8 7 An understanding of the rationale and substance of these tests
will assist in creating the new test of sanity to be executed.
A test known as the M'Naghten rule has been accepted in a majority of
the jurisdictions of the United States.88 One commentator states the test
as follows:
Under M'Naghten, an accused is not criminally responsible if, at
the time of committing the act, he was laboring under such a
defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the
nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it
that he did not know he was doing what was wrong.8 9
Some states that have adopted the M'Naghten rule have also incorpo-
rated the "irresistible impulse" test. This test "requires a verdict of not
guilty by reason of insanity if it is found that the defendant had a mental
disease which kept him from controlling his conduct."9 0
" See, e.g., Platt and Diamond, The Origins of the 'Right and Wrong" Test of Criminal
Responsibility and its Subsequent Development in the United States: An Historical Survey,
54 CAiF. L. REv. 1227 (1966); Morris, The Criminal Responsibility of the Mentally Ill, 33
SYRACUSE L. REv. 477 (1982).
87 See infra note 92.
" Ohio adopted the M'Naghten rule in State v. Brown, 5 Ohio St. 3d 133,449 N.E.2d 449
(1983). Congress adopted the rule for the Federal Courts in 18 U.S.C. § 20 (1984), but
slightly changed the rule. 18 U.S.C. § 20 provides in relevant part that:
It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution under any Federal statute that, at
the time of the commission of the facts constituting the offense, the defendant, as
a result of a severe mental disease or defect, was unable to appreciate the nature
and quality or the wrongfulness of his acts.
s LAFAvE, supra note 7, at 310.
o Id. at 320. See, e.g., Waite, Irresistable Impulse and Criminal Liability, 23 Mic. L.
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If the defendant appears incompetent at the time of the criminal
proceedings, the trial court judge will order him examined. If the accused
is found to be insane, then he is committed to a mental hospital until he
is mentally fit enough to stand trial.91 'The question of competency to
stand trial is not concerned with the defendant's responsibility but rather
with his ability to participate in the proceedings in a meaningful way."92
The Supreme Court in Dusky v. United States93 stated the common law
test for competency as follows:
It is not enough for the... judge to find that "the defendant [is]
oriented to time and place and [has] some recollection of events;"
rather, "the test must be whether he has sufficient present ability
to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding-and whether he has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him.4
In proposing a new test for sanity, it is important to recall why the Ford
Court deemed it cruel and inhuman under the Eighth Amendment to
execute an insane person. Therefore, as each element of the test is
presented an accompanying rationale under the Ford decision will follow.
In this manner, the test for sanity will fulfill the legal definition of sanity
as well as assure that the rationale and justification of the death penalty
are met.
The first element in this test is: Whether the inmate comprehends the
physical finality of death. This element can be fulfilled by simply asked
the prisoner questions similar to "what happens when you die?", "what
does death mean to you?," and "when does life end?" If these questions
may appear to border on queries into one's religious beliefs, then they are
properly framed, for the justification of this type of question is to give the
inmate an opportunity to clear his conscience and make his peace with
Rav. 443 (1925); Hoedemaker, "Irresistible Impulse" as a Defense in Criminal Law, 23 WAsH.
L. REv. 1 (1943).
91 LAFAvE, supra note 7, at 333. In Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354,370 (1983), the
Court held:
When a criminal defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that
he is not guilty of a crime by reason of insanity, the Constitution permits the
Government, on the basis of the insanity judgment, to confine him to a mental
institution until such time as he has regained his sanity or is no longer a danger
to himself or society.
See, e.g., Margulies, The Pandemonium between the Mad and the Bad: Proce-
dures for the Commitment and Release of Insanity Aquittes after Jones u. United
States, 36 Rutrazs L. REv. 793 (1984).
2 LAFAvE, supra note 7, at 333. See. e.g., LABORATORY OF CobwUNITY PsycmATRY, HARvARn
MEDICAL ScHooL, Co~MfprNcE To STAND TRuL Am MUNTL kumsm (1974); ROEsCH & GeLDING,
Co~MgrENcy ro STAND TRLAL (1980); Silten & Tullis, Mental Incompetency in Criminal
Proceedings, 28 HAsrwras LJ. 1053 (1977); Annot, 23 A.LR.4th 493 (1983).
3 362 U.S. 402 (1960).
4 362 U.S. at 402.
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his God. Justice Marshall, in Ford, cited one commentator as saying "that
it is uncharitable to dispatch an offender 'into another world, when he is
not of a capacity to fit himself for it."'5 If the prisoner understands death
and what it means to him, then the second element of the test can be
implemented.
The second element of the test is: Whether the inmate recognizes and
understands the causal link between his act of murder and his penalty.
This is perhaps the most crucial part of this new insanity test, for
retribution is the main justification of capital punishment.96
The Ford majority was cognizant of the importance of this justification
and noted that, "the community's quest for 'retribution'-the need to
offset a criminal act by a punishment of equivalent'moral' quality-is not
served by execution of an insane person, which has a 'lesser value' than
that of the crime for which he is to be punished."97
The third element of the test for sanity to stand execution is really a
test in itself borrowed from probate law. In Ohio, the "Niemes test"98 is
the test used to determine if one is legally competent to make a will. This
test is the only one needed to be passed to make a testamentary
disposition, and can be fulfilled even if the person in question has
physical defects 99 or sickness l oo that make him appear incompetent,
cannot read or write,01' or fails to function socially. 0 2
The elements of the third prong of the new test for sanity are as follows:
Whether the inmate knows and understands: (1) his property; (2) the
nature of his acts; and (3) his family, or friends, including their names
and is able to identify them. Although there are other elements to the
original Niemes test, 0 3 the omitted parts deal exclusively with the
disposition of property and the ability of the testator to know people who
have claims against him, and as such would be irrelevant to the
9, Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595,2601 (1986). Justice Marshall here cites Hawles,
supra note 15.
96 See supra note 75.
97 Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2601. See, e.g., Note, The Eighth Amendment and the Execution of
the Presently Incompetent, 32 STAN. L. Rav. 765 (1980).
98 This test was created in Niemes v. Niemes, 97 Ohio St. 145, 119 N.E.2d 503 (1917).
In Niemes, the Ohio Supreme Court held that the mental capacity to make a will requires
the testator to understand the nature of the act he is performing, the general extent of
property of which he is disposing, the relation which he holds to those who have claims upon
him, and to appreciate his relation to members of his family.
It is important to note that this test has been used successfully in probate law for seventy
years to determine legal competency. This shows that the test can be used in actual practice
to determine one's competency.
11 See Brown v. Jacoby, 55 Ohio App. 250, 9 N.E.2d 693 (1937).
'00 See Fulkerson v. Fulkerson, 12 O.L.A. 324, 35 O.L.R. 478 (1932).
Io' See Barlion v. Connor, 9 Ohio App. 72, 31 O.C.A. 463 (1917).
102 See, Ketteman v. Metzger, 13 O.C.D. 61, 3 Cir. Ct. R. 224 (1901).
103 See supra note 98 for the Niemes holding which created the test.
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determination of a condemned prisoner's sanity. Even though a few parts
of the Niemes test will not be used, it is still a valid manner to determine
basic competency.
The first part of the third element in the new test for competency asks
whether the inmate knows his property. In a will context this may
encompass both real and personal property and would be strictly con-
strued because of the basic presumption that a sane man knows his own
property, no matter where it is situated. Although a death row inmate
may not have vast amounts of wealth and land to remember and have
knowledge of, this aspect of the test remains true, for no matter how little
the amount of personal property an inmate may possess, he still would be
expected to distinguish his own property from others. It may appear that
this part of the test is too easily passed; however, if one were to apply this
element of the test to Alvin Ford, he would be hard pressed to overcome
it. 104
Whether the inmate knows the nature of his acts is the second element
of the Niemes test as used here. This test can be simply applied by merely
asking the inmate about his common day to day activities, limited as they
may be. If a prisoner can't remember what he does during the day and
other aspects of his personal life, there is no way one can term him
sane.10 5 When this part of the Niemes test is applied, the testator's ability
to handle his personal business affairs is examined, as well as his
personal relationships with others. The same form of inquiry can be used
on an inmate, if applicable.
The third element of the Niemes test asks whether the condemned
prisoner has the ability to recognize members of his family and identify
them by name. The classic situation is when a sick person, because of
drugs or impending death, cannot identify members of his own family.
Persons under this disability are not permitted to draft a will and under
this new test for sanity, they would not be executed.10 6
If the Niemes test assures that one is legally competent to make a will,
it would follow that this test, coupled with the other two elements, is
sufficient to determine competency to stand execution. However, if the
Niemes test is used alone, it would trivialize the test of competency for
an inmate, and reduce the importance of his sanity to the same standard
the law imposes on one wishing to give away his property after death. On
the other hand, when the Niemes test for competency is coupled with the
1I4 See Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2598 (1986).
'0s This part of the test is not meant to be trivialized by asking the inmate questions like
"what did you have for lunch yesterday?" Many sane persons can not readily answer that
query. However, when applied to correspondence, conversations and other meaningful acts
the test can be useful.
106 This is not to suggest that every inmate tested needs to be suffering from the type of
disability described here, for a variety of mental illnesses produce similar effects.
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other elements, it assures that the prisoner is legally, and mentally
ready to be put to death.
C. Structure of the Hearing on the Issue of Insanity
As previously noted,10 7 the Ford Court leaves it up to the states to
determine what type of hearing will be used to decide the issues of a
condemned prisoner's sanity, yet the Court gives only limited guidance to
the states, 0 8 and states that it does not suggest a "full trial on the issue
of insanity."10 9 Justice Powell went further than the Court and suggested
that only the most minimum due process standards need to be employed
when dealing with a convicted person."10
Given this background and judicial insight, one may think that the
new type of hearing on sanity at the time of execution may resemble a
lesson on how minimal due process standards can become without being
unconstitutional. However, this assumption is far from true, for one must
remember that a human life hangs in the balance of the proceedings.
Therefore, in proposing a new procedure for the determination of sanity
of a condemned inmate it is better to err on the side of reliability and thus
place substantial due process considerations in the procedure.
Another reason why sufficient due process standards should be placed
in the hearing is that if the statute creating the procedure is later tested
constitutionally, the statute will have a margin for error that will make
it almost unchallengeable."'
The first part of the new hearing procedure is that counsel for the
defense will be permitted to present any relevant evidence it has. The
Florida statute'1 2 in Ford failed because it did "not permit any material
relevant to the ultimate decision to be submitted on behalf of the prisoner
facing execution." 113 Since "the fundamental requisite of due process is
the opportunity to be heard,"" 4 it would not be rationale to severely
restrict whatever evidence counsel for the allegedly insane inmate can
present, for there is no reason at this point in the proceedings to do so.
107 Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2606.
'1 Id. at 2604-05. In summary, the three reasons the Florida statute failed to pass due
process standards were: 1) the failure to include the prisoner in the truth seeking process -
no opportunity to be heard; 2) the denial of any opportunity to challenge or impeach the
state-appointed psychiatrists - need to cross-examine; and 3) the State placed the determi-
nation of sanity wholly in the executive branch - since the Governor has a duty to enforce
the laws, he would be a biased decision maker.
109 Id. at 2606.
110 Id. at 2610.
" Since Ford states that a full hearing is not needed to satisfy due process, it would
stand to reason that a full hearing more than satisfies due process.
112 See supra note 26 for the full text of the Florida statute.
113 Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2604.
114 Grannis v. Oddean, 234 U.S. 385 (1914).
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Under the statute in Ford,115 the procedure for determining a prison-
er's sanity was done almost summarily, with no hearings or argument,
possibly because Florida did not wish to have full hearings on every claim
of incompetence. This rationale, aside from being deemed unconstitu-
tional in Ford, is not needed under the new statutory scheme being
proposed," 5 for a preliminary determination stage is employed to "weed
out" frivolous or non-meritous claims.
A justification for permitting full presentment of all relevant evidence
lies in the Supreme Court's holding in Jurek v. Texas.117 The Court in
Jurek held that in a procedure or case that determines whether one will
be put to death, the factfinder must "have before it all possible relevant
information about the individual defendant whose fate it must deter-
mine." 1 8
The defense will also need to have the ability to present all of its
relevant evidence because it has the burden, in this new statutory
scheme, of rebutting a presumption of sanity. This presumption will be
placed upon those inmates who did not raise the issue of sanity at the
time of the crime or at trial, and/or those inmates who have no history of
mental illness. 119
Justice Powell supported a presumption of sanity in his concurring
opinion of Ford. He stated:
[I]n order to have been convicted and sentenced, petitioner must
have been judged competent to stand trial, or his competency
must have been a serious question for the trial court. The State
therefore may properly presume that petitioner remains sane at
the time sentence is to be carried out .... 120
The defendant's right to cross-examine and impeach state appointed
psychiatrists comprises the third part of the proposed hearing procedure.
"' See supra note 26 for the full text of the Florida statute.
116 See supra text p. 531 for a discussion of the proposed preliminary test.
117 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976). See e.g. Black, Due Process for Death: Jurek v. Texas and
Companion Cases, 26 CATH. U. L. Rnv. 1 (1976); Black, Capital Punishment: The Inevita-
bility of Caprice and Mistake, 22 WniAbrr L. J. 261 (1974).
I's 428 U.S. at 276.
119 Although the majority of death row inmates never seek professional counseling for
mental or emotional problems, are not committed to an institution, or raise the insanity
issue at any point in the proceedings against them, this presumption will not prejudice
those inmates who have developed their mental illness while waiting for execution, for this
situation is well documented and accepted.
See, Ward, supra note 3, at 38-48; See, e.g., Bluestone & McGahee, Reaction to Extreme
Stress: Impending Death by Execution, 119 Ajwcm J. PSYCHATY 393 (1962); Gallemore &
Panton, Inmate Responses to Lengthy Death Row Confinement, 129 Abi. J. PSYcMATRY 167
(1972); Johnson, Under Sentence ofDeath: The Psychology of Death Row Confinement, 5 LAw
& PsyCHO LOGY REv. 141 (1979).
120 Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2611 (1986).
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This right was lacking in the statute at issue in Ford,121 and is seen as
fundamental to due process.122
Without the right to effective assistance of counsel, 2 3 and a state-
funded psychiatrist' 2 ' to help prepare the inmate's claim of insanity, the
hearing and its procedures would be meaningless. Since the Court has
held both of these elements crucial to a fair hearing, it would be a major
error to omit them. Although the Florida statute125 overturned in Ford
did not make provision for a state-funded psychiatrist, this is understand-
able for the statute became effective in 1985, and the right to a
state-funded psychiatrist was not "created" until later that year.126 The
Ford Court ignored this deficiency in the statute, possibly because they
did not deem it applicable to hearings on the question of sanity.12 7
The final aspect of the decision to be made concerning the hearing on
the issue of insanity is whether a judge or jury will make the ultimate
determination of competency. Since the test for sanity developed ear-
lier' 28 will be used to measure the competency of the prisoner, it is
imperative that a trained judge decide the issue.
A trial judge will readily understand the issues in the test, but a jury
21 See supra note 108.
2 If cross examinations are not used when determining the inmate's sanity, unchal-
lenged testimony will be equivalent to non-participation by the defendant - an approach
which was struck down in Ford.
123 See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). In Strickland, the Court created
a new test for effective assistance of counsel, which holds that a defendant claiming that he
was not effectively represented must prove that (1) counsel's performance was deficient in
the sense that counsel was not a responsible competent attorney; and (2) that the
deficiencies in counsel's performance were prejudicial to the defense, in the sense that there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.
1 Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985). The Ake Court held that there are two
circumstances in which the defendant is entitled to a psychiatrist's assistance at state's
expense: (1) when it is shown that a defendant's sanity is likely to be a significant factor in
his defense; and (2) when, in a capital sentencing proceeding, the state tries to justify the
death penalty by showing that the defendant will remain dangerous in the future.
In Ake the Court reasoned that: "Without a psychiatrist's assistance, the defendant
cannot offer a well-informed expert's opposing view, and thereby loses a significant
opportunity to raise in the juror's minds questions about the state's proof...." 470 U.S. at
84.
Although in the proposed procedures no jury will be used, it is still important that the
judge have two different points of view regarding the expert testimony. Even if the defense
is given an opportunity to cross-examine the state's psychiatrists, it would be ineffective
unless given its own expert to assist in the understanding of the opposing views.
See e.g., Note, Expert Services and the Indigent Criminal Defendant: The Constitutional
Mandate of Ake v. Oklahoma, 84 MICH. L. Rv. 1326 (1986).
125 See supra note 26 for the full text of the statute.
"I See supra note 124.
127 See supra note 24.
128 See supra text pp. 533-35 and accompanying notes 95-106.
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may disregard the test to make the kind of "gut-level" determination that
juries are used to making. For instance, if an inmate physically appears
to be under a disability, a jury will naturally assume that "since he looks
crazy-he must be crazy." Along with the intricacies of the proposed test
for insanity comes the requirement that one "look" into the mind of the
person and to disregard what the person "looks" like. 29
The finding of the county court judge after this hearing will not be
appealable to a higher court. 130 If a finding of "not insane" were
appealable, the type of endless adjudication this entire process seeks to
avoid would be sanctioned.
One issue that remains is whether an inmate found "not insane" may
subsequently file another, non-dismissable, petition with the same court
again raising the issue of the prisoner's competency. The resolution of
this question may determine if the proposed procedures can be successful.
One possible solution would be to set the execution of a person found "not
insane" shortly after he was judged as such. This solution would avoid the
problem of subsequent non-meritorious petitions which would, even
under the preliminary determination section of the procedures' 3 ' created
to deal with this problem, waste valuable resources. However, this
answer would be limited to those inmates who have exhausted their
mandatory and collateral appeals.132
Now that the theoretical justifications for the proposed test for sanity
at the time of execution and changes in procedures for determining the
issue have been presented, the current Ohio statutes, and construing case
law, concerning these areas will be examined and finally the proposed
statutes will be presented.
VII. ANALYSIS OF CURRENT OMO STATUTES
Ohio Revised Code section 2949.28 provides:
If a convict sentenced to death appears to be insane, the warden
or sheriff having custody of such convict shall give notice thereof
to a judge of the court of common pleas of the county in which the
prisoner is confined. Said judge shall inquire into such insanity at
a time and place to be fixed by said judge, or impanel a jury for
that purpose and shall give immediate notice thereof to the
prosecuting attorney of the county in which the prisoner was
129 See supra notes 98-101.
130 The only appealable grounds would be constitutional, which this test meets.
131 See text p. 531 and accompanying notes 83-85 for a discussion of this aspect of the
procedural process.
132 A considerable number of inmates fall into this category. See supra note 79.
1987]
25Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 1987
CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW
convicted. Execution of the sentence shall be suspended pending
completion of the inquiry.'3 3
The preliminary determination stage of the proposed proceedings is
equivalent to this statute. On the face of this statute, an inmate can have
his execution postponed, receive a hearing date, and have a jury impan-
eled for the purpose of inquiring into his sanity merely by physically
"appearing insane." Although the statute does not state "physically
appear insane," on its face, the only logical construction of the statute
leads one to this conclusion, for one cannot appear insane without some
sort of physical manifestation. The reverse may also be true, for it is
possible that a person appearing normal and competent may actually be
insane. The "test" under Ohio Revised Code section 2949.28 is really not
test at all.
Any person whose life depends upon his ability to convince someone of
his insanity would probably be very capable of doing so. It is understand-
able that the Ohio legislature meant to make it easy for an inmate on
death row to have his sanity checked at the first sign of unfitness, yet the
"test" places at the disposal of the inmate and his counsel the ability to
put a halt to the time table of his execution. The statute permits the
sentence to be suspended until the inquiry is completed, and then other
statutes set the procedures to be followed.13 4
Soon after the enactment of Ohio Revised Code sections 2949.28,
2949.29,135 and 2949.30136 an Ohio appellate court construed the term
"insane" in these statutes. In Re Keaton137 held:
The test of whether a convict awaiting execution is "insane"
within the meaning of R.C. 2949.28, R.C. 2949.29, and R.C.
2949.30 is not whether he is "mentally ill," but whether he has
sufficient intelligence to understand the nature of the proceed-
ings against him, what he was tried for, the purpose of his
punishment, the impending fate that awaits him, a sufficient
understanding to know any fact which might exist which would
make his punishment unjust or unlawful, and the intelligence to
convey such information to his attorney or the court.138
The Keaton test for insanity at the time of execution is based entirely
on an inmate's "intelligence." This standard is inappropriate, for one's
133 Osno REv. CODS ANN. § 2949.28 (Page 1986).
134 See id. §§ 2949.29, 2949.30 and infra note 144.
135 See supra note 26 for the full text of the statute.
'3' See infra note 144 for the full text of the statute.
137 19 Ohio App. 2d 254, 250 N.E.2d 901 (1969), vacated sub nom. Keaton v. Ohio, 408
U.S. 936 (1972).
138 Syllabus of the Court, 3, 19 Ohio App. 2d at 255.
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intelligence has nothing to do with his competence.' 3 9 The first part of the
Keaton test aspires to establish the same level of certainty regarding why
the prisoner is being put to death as the proposed test for sanity at the
time of execution. 140 Another similarity between the two tests appears
when the Keaton test asks whether the convict knows his impending
fate-this is very similar to the proposed test, which inquires whether the
inmate knows the meaning and finality of death.141
The main problem with the Keaton test is that it asks whether the
convict has a sufficient understanding to know any fact which might exist
which would make his punishment unjust or unlawful. This analysis is
incorrect, for at this stage in the proceedings, the only issue being raised
is the inmate's competency, and if the inmate has the ability to tell his
attorney that he is insane-is he really incompetent? This paradox is
resolved by the proposed test for insanity by employing the Niemes
test,142 which goes to the heart of the legal competency issue.
The final part of the Keaton test asks whether the inmate has to convey
such information to his attorney. This aspect of the test also suffers from
paradoxical reasoning. If an allegedly insane inmate can assist his
attorney in proving that he is insane, his sanity really is not an issue.
These defects in the Keaton test are cured under the proposed procedures
by the use of a preliminary determination of insanity which excludes all
counsel from participation. 143
Ohio Revised Code section 2949.29 provides:
In addition to the warden or sheriff, the judge of the court of
common pleas, clerk of the court of common please, and the
prosecuting attorney shall attend the inquiry commenced as
provided in section 2949.28 of'the Revised Code. Witnesses may
be produced and examined before the judge or jury, and all
findings shall be in writing signed by the judge or jury. If it is
found that the convict is not insane, the sentence shall be
executed at the time previously appointed, unless such time has
passed pending completion of the inquiry, in which case the judge
conducting the inquiry shall appoint a time for execution. If it is
found that the convict is insane, the judge shall suspend the
execution until the warden or sheriff receive a warrant from the
governor directing such execution as provided in section 2949.30
of the Revised Code. The finding, and the order of such judge,
'3 See supra note 101.
140 See supra text pp. 532-34 and accompanying notes 87-97.
141 Id.
142 See supra note 20.
143 See supra text pp. 534-35 and accompanying notes 98-103.
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certified by him, shall be entered on the journal of the court by
the clerk.
The Court in Keaton144 also construed this statute and held:
Where a statutory procedure has been provided for suspending an
execution upon notice by the warden to a judge of the Common
Pleas Court of the county in which the prisoner is confined that
such convict 'appears to be insane,' the inquiry' by the court 'into
such sanity' is not an adversary proceeding, the convict is not a
'party' thereto, the determination of the question of present
insanity is not subject to judicial review, and such convict has no
right of appeal from a factual determination by the judge of the
common pleas court that the convict is 'not insane."145
Ohio Revised Code section 2949.29 is clearly constitutional. After the
Ford decision, any statute dealing with procedures to determine the
sanity of a condemned convict must provide the inmate with an oppor-
tunity to be heard and to cross-examine witnesses against him, including
state-appointed physicians.146 Revised Code section 2949.29 provides for
the production and examination of witnesses, which is the minimum that
the Ford decision required of such a statute.1 47
The Court in Keaton reads section 2949.29 as meaning that the
"inquiry by the court into the convict's sanity is not an adversary
proceeding, and the convict is not a party thereto," renders the statute
open to constitutional attack. The Court in Ford meant to create a
procedural scheme that would possess the best elements of an adversarial
proceeding---cross-examination and an ability to argue on one's behalf-
yet would not require a full trial on the question of insanity.148 Therefore,
although section 2949.29 is constitutional on its face, the construing case
law interpretation of the statute is invalid.
'" Keaton also discusses a related Ohio statute, Omo REv. CODE Aim. § 2949.30, dealing
with a convict's restoration of sanity. That section provides:
If a convict under sentence of death is found insane under section 2949.29 of the
Revised Code, and if he is subsequently restored, the warden or sheriff having
custody of such convict shall forthwith transmit a copy of the finding of
restoration to the governor, who, when convinced that the convict is of sound
mind, shall issue a warrant appointing a time of his execution.
Omo REv. CODE AwN. § 2949.30 (Page 1986).
I" Syllabus of the Court, 2. In re Keaton 19 Ohio App. 2d 254, 255, 250 N.E. 2d 901,
vacated sub noma. Keaton v. Ohio, 408 U.S. 936 (1972).
146 Ford v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2595, 2605 (1986).
147 See supra note 68 for other state statutes that may be deemed unconstitutional under
Ford.
148 See Ford, 106 S. Ct. at 2605.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Ford v. Wainwright makes it unconstitutional under the Eighth
Amendment's cruel and unusual punishment clause to execute an insane
prisoner. This rule has been the common law doctrine for hundreds of
years in England and currently is the American rule as well.
Ford does not create an inordinate burden on the states to comply with
when determining the competency of a condemned inmate. Compliance
with Ford's due process requirements can be met simply by placing the
factfinding process outside of the executive branch, and providing the
allegedly insane inmate with an opportunity to be heard and conduct
cross-examinations, yet several states' existing procedures are no longer
valid in Ford's wake.149
The most useful manner in which to summarize the changes this work
proposes is to put them in statutory form, with the proposed sections
italicized.
The new Ohio Revised Code section 2949.28 would provide:
(A) If a warden or sheriff, having custody of a convict sentenced to
death, has good reason to believe that such convict is insane, the
warden or sheriff having custody of such convict shall give notice
thereof to a judge of the court of common please of the county in
which the prisoner was convicted.
(B) Said judge shall appoint three disinterested psychiatrists to
inquire into the convicts insanity. After spending as much time
examining the convict as they deem necessary, the panel shall
submit in writing a report of their findings and prognosis to the
judge of the convicting county court their findings.
(C) If the panel finds that the convict is competent to be executed,
his execution date will be affirmed, but if the date of his execution
has passed, a new date will be set.
(D) If the panel finds the convict is insane, the judge shall:
1. Notify the prosecuting attorney of the county in which the
prisoner was convicted; 2. Set a date for a hearing, whose proce-
dures are governed by R.C. 294929; and 3. Suspend execution of
the sentence pending completion of the inquiry.
The new Ohio Revised Code section 2949.29 would provide:
(A) The judge of the court of common pleas for the county in which
the prisoner was originally convicted shall be the sole factfinder
and his decision shall not be reviewable. In addition to the warden
or sheriff, the clerk of the court of common pleas, and prosecuting
149 See supra note 68.
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attorney shall attend the inquiry commenced as provided for in
section 2949.28 of the Revised Code.
(B) If indigent, the convict is entitled to have a psychiatrist
appointed for him at the State's expense.
(C) Witnesses may be produced and examined before the judge
and all relevant evidence may be presented.
(D) For purposes of this hearing, if the convict failed to raise the
issue of insanity at any point previous to these proceedings and/or
has no history of mental illness, he must overcome a rebuttable
presumption of sanity.
(E) The only issue to be determined in this hearing is the test for
sanity defined in R.C. 2949.29.5.
(F) If it is found that the convict is not insane, the sentence shall
be executed at the time previously appointed, unless such time
has passed pending completion of the inquiry, in which case the
judge conducting the inquiry shall appoint a time for execution. If
it is found that the convict is insane, the judge shall suspend the
execution until the warden or sheriff receives a warrant from the
governor directing such execution as provided in section 2949.30
of the Revised Code.150
The following statute does not presently exist. It is a codification of the
proposed test for sanity. The new Ohio Revised Code section 2949.29.5
would provide:
For an inmate to be judged competent for execution it must be
proven that he has the ability to:
(A) Comprehend the physical finality of death;
(B) Understand the causal link between his criminal act and his
impending punishment;
(C) Know, comprehend and recognize:
(1) his property;
(2) the nature of his acts;
(3) his family, or friends, as well as the ability to identify them
by name.
If these new statutes are enacted, Ohio will be in compliance with the
decision of Ford v. Wainwright.
STEvEN J. Hup
150 See supra note 144 for the full text of Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2949.30 (Page 1986).
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